INTRODUCTION
The Arctic expanse is one of the few areas on earth whose legal status has yet to be determined conclusively. The Law of the Sea Convention (UN, 1982) cap is an additional incentive for increased interest, as theoretically it could facilitate access to resources that are assumed to be located under the Arctic seabed.
The primary goal of this paper is to verify the extent to which the acquisition of exclusive rights to the exploitation of Arctic mineral resources is the true motive for the actions vicinis regionibus map (Hondius, 1625), still shows the North Pole surrounded by four islands roughly the size of Greenland (Fig. 1) . Today, our insight on the Arctic is sub stantially greater than it was centuries ago. We no longer have doubts regarding the existence, location, dimensions, or even political status of the individual landmasses that lie in the "Far North"; however, there is still disagreement about jurisdiction in some maritime zones.
From a geographical-political standpoint, five countries possess territories that lie within the region: Russia, Nor way, Denmark, Canada, and the United States. The politi cal involvement of Denmark-and, to a certain extent,
Norway-in the Arctic is special in nature. Danish legisla tion stipulates that Greenland is an integral part of the ter ritorial possessions of Denmark; since 1979, however, the island has enjoyed far-reaching and continually widening autonomy with respect to its European proprietor. A good measure of the sovereignty and competence of the Green landic government was the withdrawal of the country from the European Communities in 1985, the only such case in the history of the European Union (Anon., 1985 (Anon., , 2011 Sobczynski, 2006 ). Norway's presence in the Arctic is nota ble on the Svalbard Archipelago, a Norwegian dependency that also has a special status. Norway is in full political control of the administration of the archipelago by virtue of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920, with each of the 39 con tracting parties reserving the right, among others, to set tlement and economic activity on the islands (Sobczynski, 2006) .
THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN
The first claims to possession of the Arctic Ocean were made more than 100 years ago. In a 1907 speech to the Canadian Senate, P. Poirier suggested dividing the Arc tic into sectors (McRae, 1994) , and in 1925, Canada offi cially claimed the sector between 60° and 141° W (Atlas of Canada, 2009; Kubiak, 2009 and 58). The actual extent of the EEZ and continental shelf of any given country is the root of many international con flicts, given the potential economic benefits in play (Fig. 2) . The Lomonosov Ridge cuts diagonally across the bot tom of the Arctic Ocean. The dilemma regarding which continent the formation belongs to can be resolved only by resorting to historical geology. Most contemporary investi gations conclude that the Lomonosov Ridge separated from Eurasia some 57 to 58 million years ago, having indeed pre viously comprised part of the continental margin (Heezen and Ewing, 1961; Jokat, 2005) . That said, the implications this conclusion has for the current claims of each state involved remain to be determined. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, the fact that a given area was a part of one of the continents in the distant geological past has no bear ing on its current standing; the crux of the matter is whether or not the Lomonosov Ridge is part of the continental mar gin today. Using historical geology as a valid argument in the discussion on the shelf's status is about as convincing as arguing that can be represented graphically by Hubbert curves (Hubbert, 1956) . The model posits that because existing reserves are finite, each area of exploitation is doomed to reach a peak rate of extraction. The current Hubbert curve of world petroleum production rates suggests that the peak rate was either reached in 2008 or will be reached within the next two to three years. It is useful to note, however, that the authors of the Hubbert curve, published 10 years ago, predicted that maximum production would be attained in 2005, and if we follow previous predictions farther back in time, we find a corresponding downward trend toward earlier peak oil dates (see Smil, 2006) . The curves continue to be published regularly, regardless, and they are often dispatched with accompanying comments and predictions whose general mood is best conveyed by Figure 3 .
Despite relentless scientific research that aims to replace fossil fuels with renewable sources of energy, attempts to provide a renewable future have yielded few results, and the world continues to depend largely on non-renewable resources. Nonetheless, as we are currently unable to esti mate with confidence exactly when petroleum will turn into a raw commodity of marginal significance, the stated goal Arctic pretenders in the near future, it is advisable to exer cise extreme caution. The research conducted by the U.S.
Geological Survey was the first to be carried out on such a wide scale and was intended, to a large extent, to pave the way for future endeavors. The study provided data on the probability of encountering a given volume of petroleum in selected sectors in the region; it failed, however, to pinpoint specific locations and come up with precise quantitative fig ures (Bird et al., 2008) . Also, the published results indicate that the likelihood of finding petroleum in and around the central part of the Arctic seabed is close to zero (Fig. 4) . The ocean floor as a whole, and what lies beneath the Arctic Ocean in particular, remains notoriously poorly researched. This is true for both its geological structure and, to a certain degree, the bathymetric relief of the land underneath the depths, while our knowledge of some of the keystones of the environment, such as the benthic fauna of the central zone of the Arctic, is practically non-existent (W^slawski, 2010) . This state of affairs was perhaps best expressed by R.L. Hotz (2007) April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico and the resulting environ mental disaster, many plans to exploit previously untapped undersea oil deposits using semi-submersible rigs are bound to be put on hold.
Even if technological development enables us to begin mining the Arctic seabed for petroleum, transporting the oil to refineries will require icebreakers to escort the oil tankers on each journey (Jaworski, 2009). A feasible alternative to this would be to introduce radical structural changes to the tankers that would enable them to traverse and navigate the ice independently and unaccompanied.
It also seems likely that technological advances will enable new methods of oil exploitation in the foreseeable future, with pipelines located on the sea bottom. In each of these cases, the costs of the drilling process would rise dramatically. Only if the Arctic ice sheet were to completely disintegrate could the costs be kept near today's level; yet numerous contemporary studies suggest that complete disintegration will most certainly not increase in demand, it seems, has become an inescapable reality: the need for petroleum in the rising markets in China and India is rapidly increasing, and the consump tion of oil in developed countries is on the rise as well.
Note, however, that rising demand is continuously curbed by a wide range of factors, such as the replacement of one resource with another (biofuels), the implementation of energy-efficient technologies, and the rising prices of petro leum-based products. Supply is also bound to expand for the time being, though it is difficult to estimate how long the numerous methods of boosting it will keep pace with ris ing demand and maintain prices that are lower than the cost of drilling in the Arctic. The means of increasing supply include, among others, the discovery of new oil reserves, innovation and development in seeking out oil deposits and information processing, as well as the exploitation of sec ondary reserve deposits and less abundant reservoirs.
Similarly, an economic profit-and-loss estimate for natu ral gas exploitation could be developed. In addition to the factors already mentioned above, the increasing prospects for shale gas exploitation in many areas of the world should be noted. In some cases, finding new resources may radi cally change the situation of their possessors; a leading example is the United States, a former importer of natural gas that is now covering all its gas-related needs with its own exploitation. Surely, increasing supply will help keep market prices for gas at relatively low levels, contributing to the delay in exploiting the Arctic resources.
IS OIL BEHIND THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC?
Without petroleum, the economy of today's world cannot Stone Age came to an end, not because we had a lack of stones, and the oil age will come to an end not because we have a lack of oil" (Fagan, 2000) .
Similar statements are upheld by many analysts. Simon (1981) argued that price is the simplest and most responsive indicator of fluctuations in the volume of a given resource available on the market, and that the real prices of oil in the world had been falling for years. In the 1996 revision of that publication, Simon (1996:6) Simon's approach was met with vigorous protest and criticism from supporters of the reasoning presented by the Club of Rome in its reports and is a prime example of the dynamic general equilibrium approach to the analysis of mineral resources, which posits that "resources do not pos sess a finite amount and are rather a 'function' of human knowledge" (Fierla, 2005:57) . On economic grounds, clas sical economists Ricardo (1957) and Mill (1965-66) significant barrier to development, mostly because of pro gress in civilization and technology.
Assuming that the dynamic approach to mineral resources is sound, as it seems to be in the face of several decades' worth of encouraging proof, and with a closer look at the changes that took place in the structure of energy production in the world throughout the 20th century, one can venture to claim that human beings might never have to resort to the exploitation of Arctic oil. As the age of petro leum began, so will it eventually end. This holds true for all energy resources. Natural gas, a pivotal energy source whose part in primary energy worldwide is rapidly increas ing towards the 30% mark, and without which the survival of today's economy is difficult to fathom, has been used on a large industrial scale only since the 1960s. Nuclear ener gy's share in electrical energy in the world is over 16%, up from zero as recently as the 1940s. Therefore, it seems pos sible that technological progress will one day allow human ity to replace oil with another energy source that is more efficient, cheaper, and perhaps renewable.
The context outlined above once more begs the question of what is the real motivation behind the ongoing political dispute over the Arctic. Are the contestants in the sym bolic race for the North Pole really intent on hoarding the vast expanses of the underwater oil reservoirs under the Arctic seabed-reservoirs whose extraction will not begin for at least several decades (and perhaps will never even reach that stage)? An affirmative answer to this question would imply that the nations involved recognize and accept the static resource approach championed by the Club of Rome and the peak oil prophets associated with it (Mead ows et al., 1992) . It is the cautious and conservative way, prompted by fear for the future of energy supply and the potential oil-based economic profit that can be reached sev eral decades from now. If, however, the dynamic approach is chosen as a point of reference, then gaining control over Arctic oil is nothing more than an excuse for a race that shows its true colors only when viewed from a political perspective. Alternatively, it might be assumed that many decision-makers have wrong perceptions of the potential for oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic, and that the scram ble is one of the effects of their struggle to secure energy resources for their countries. However* it seems impossible to prove that qualified advisors intentionally mislead their patrons, so this hypothesis should be rejected.
The central part of the Arctic is one of the last expanses on the planet with a still ill-defined political status. The Law of the Sea Convention was intended to resolve any and all marine conflicts, but some of its provisions leave space for interpretation, a fact duly noted and used by countries interested in expanding their possessions into the Arctic zone (see Lukaszuk, 2004) . The region is a subject of dis pute because it is currently outside the jurisdiction of any country, and therefore, its occupation does not require war tactics and armed interventions. The heightened activity of some players, particularly Russia, can be viewed as an expression of imperial ambitions and the desire to realize them. Within the frame of the Arctic issue, Osica (2010) calls both Russia and Canada "Arctic warriors". Follow ing the humiliating defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghani stan in the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR, the progressive estrangement of the traditional Soviet sphere of influence, and Central and Eastern Europe's accession to NATO and the European Union, Russia seems to be in search of a zone it could administer successfully. The political activity of the remaining countries can be seen in part as a knee-jerk reaction to Russia's mobilization, which in turn has led to heightened international tension.
It is useful to note that the scramble presented in this paper takes place over the central part of the Arctic Ocean, while most oil and natural gas deposits discovered to date in the Arctic lie within the exclusive economic zones of to any given country. The reason is that most of the Arctic's petroleum and natural gas reserves lie in areas that already form part of one or more exclusive economic zones.
Primary energy production is going through deep and rapid structural changes worldwide, coupled with equally rapid development in technology relating to the substitution of finite exploitable resources with generators of renewable energy. Although the Arctic ice sheet has been shrinking at an unprecedented rate in recent years, it is impossible to state whether the technological and economic viability of the undersea exploitation of Arctic resources will precede the unseating of petroleum and natural gas as cornerstones of the world's energy network, or the other way around. It seems the rate of climate change is still too slow, and the natural gas and oil deposits currently available are still too rich, to warrant drilling for resources in deep Arctic waters in the next several decades (see Macnab et al., 2007) .
Considering both the arguments given above, political motives for the five states attempting to gain sway in the Arctic appear to be much more plausible than any economic considerations. The Arctic does not belong to any political entity, which makes effective political competition over it all the more viable. Winning this game would do much in the way of satisfying the imperial ambitions of one of the most active players-Russia.
Whatever conclusions are reached in the future regard ing the Arctic, the regulations of the widely respected Law of the Sea Convention bar any nation from political control over the North Pole because of the significant distance that separates it from dry land masses. The only way of gain ing economic control over this symbolic place is to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is part of a continental margin. 
